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Abstract
A method to hide certain quantum states in a superposition will be
proposed. Such method can be used to increase the security of a commu-
nication channel. States represent an encrypted message will disappear
during data exchange. This makes the message 100% safe under direct
measurement by an eavesdropper. No entanglement sharing is required
among the communicating parties.
1 Introduction
Establishing a secure channel is of interest. There have been efforts to provide a
way to exploit quantum mechanical systems to achieve this goal. For example,
quantum key distribution [1, 3, 5] has been there for some time. Methods to
hide classical data using quantum states among parties [2, 6]. The aim of this
paper is to show how to remove quantum states that carry encrypted message
from a superposition. The proposed method is not a substitution of the above
efforts. It can be used together with any encryption algorithm to increase the
securing of the channel during communication.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic idea of
hiding quantum states. Section 3 explains the process of hiding certain quan-
tum states. Section 4 shows how to unhide hidden states in the superposition.
Section 5 gives the analysis of the communication in the presence of eaves-
dropping. Section 6 proposes the transmission protocol by hiding a message.
Section 7 suggests possible variations to the transmission protocol to enhance
the security level. The paper ends up with a conclusion in Section 8.
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2 Basic Idea
Suppose that Alice and Bob want to exchange a message in a secure way. Alice
and Bob can use any encryption algorithm to encode the stream of bits. They
exchange the message one bit at a time using two quantum wires. Assume the
following 2-qubit quantum system,
|ψ〉 = 1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉) . (1)
The aim is to hide any two quantum states from the system, so |ψ〉 in Eqn. (1)
to be converted to one of the following systems,
1√
2
(|00〉+ |01〉) , 1√
2
(|10〉+ |11〉) , 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) ,
1√
2
(|00〉+ |10〉) , 1√
2
(|01〉+ |11〉) , 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) . (2)
This is useful in data exchange. To see this, assume that Alice wants to
send 0 to Bob, Alice has two choices: to use the first qubit so the superposition
takes the form 1√
2
(|00〉+ |01〉), or to use the second qubit so the superposition
takes the form 1√
2
(|00〉+ |10〉), i.e. one qubit is used to encode the data and
the other qubit is used to confuse any eavesdropper. In this case, the message
is 50% secure under any direct measurement by the eavesdropper. To increase
the security of the message, Alice then has another two choices, to hide or not
to hide the states. Hiding the states is to convert the above prepared system
to 1√
2
(|11〉+ |10〉) or 1√
2
(|11〉+ |01〉) respectively. In this case, the message is
100% secure under any direct measurement. Direct measurement will lead to
states that don’t represent the required message.
3 Hiding Quantum States
The aim of this section is to show the process of selecting then (optionally) hiding
certain quantum states from the superposition shown in Eqn. (1). To achieve
this, assume that we have two quantum operators: Uf and Dp, and a 3-qubit
system, where the third qubit is initialized to |0〉 and will be used temporarily
to mark the required states via entanglement. Uf is an oracle that evaluates
to 1 only for the required two states. Dp is an operator which performs the
inversion about the mean, and a phase shift of -1 on the subspace of the system
entangled with the extra qubit in state |0〉, and |1〉 respectively.
The diagonal representation of Dp when applied on 3-qubit system can take
this form [7],
Dp =
(
W⊗2 ⊗ I1
)
(2 |0〉 〈0| − I3)
(
W⊗2 ⊗ I1
)
, (3)
where the vector |0〉 used in Eqn. 3 is of length 8, Ik is the identity matrix
of size 2k × 2k, and W is the Hadamard gate. Consider a general state |ψ〉 of
3-qubit register:
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|ψ〉 =
7∑
k=0
δk |k〉 =
3∑
j=0
αj (|j〉 ⊗ |0〉) +
3∑
j=0
βj (|j〉 ⊗ |1〉), (4)
where {αj = δk : k even} and {βj = δk : k odd}. The effect of applying Dp on
|ψ〉 produces,
Dp |ψ〉 =
(
W⊗2 ⊗ I1
)
(2 |0〉 〈0| − I3)
(
W⊗2 ⊗ I1
) 7∑
k=0
δk |k〉
= 2
(
W⊗2 ⊗ I1 |0〉 〈0|W⊗2 ⊗ I1
) 7∑
k=0
δk |k〉 −
7∑
k=0
δk |k〉
=
3∑
j=0
2 〈α〉 (|j〉 ⊗ |0〉)−
7∑
k=0
δk |k〉
=
3∑
j=0
(2 〈α〉 − αj) (|j〉 ⊗ |0〉)−
3∑
j=0
βj (|j〉 ⊗ |1〉),
(5)
where 〈α〉 = 1
4
∑3
j=0 αj is the mean of the amplitudes of the subspace αj (|j〉 ⊗ |0〉),
i.e. applying the operator Dp will perform the inversion about the mean only
on the subspace αj (|j〉 ⊗ |0〉) and will only change the sign of the amplitudes
for the subspace βj (|j〉 ⊗ |1〉).
The purpose of using Dp is to hide certain states in the superposition. To
see this, let Uf be an oracle that has the following property:
Uf |x, 0〉 → |x, f(x)〉 , (6)
and
|ψ〉 = 1
2
(|x0〉+ |x1〉+ |x2〉+ |x3〉)⊗ |0〉 . (7)
Assume that Uf evaluates to 1 for any arbitrary two states in the superpo-
sition, i.e.
Uf |ψ〉 = 1
2
(|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ |0〉+ 1
2
(|x2〉+ |x3〉)⊗ |1〉 , (8)
where xi ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, then 〈α〉 = 14 and DpUf |ψ〉 will make the superposi-
tion contains only the states that make Uf evaluates to 1, i.e.
1√
2
(|x2〉+ |x3〉).
To hide the states |x2〉 and |x3〉, then Uf will be used instead of Uf , where
f = f ⊕ 1. The extra qubit can then be omitted from the system.
4 Showing Hidden States
To show the hidden states with no prior knowledge of the oracle used, the
operator G used in the original Grover’s algorithm [4] to perform the usual
inversion about the mean will be used once. The diagonal representation of G
on 2-qubit system can take this form,
G =W⊗2 (2 |0〉 〈0| − I2)W⊗2, (9)
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where the vector |0〉 used in Eqn. 9 is of length 4, and I2 is the identity matrix
of size 4× 4. Consider a general system |ψ〉 of 2-qubit register:
|ψ〉 =
3∑
j=0
αj |j〉. (10)
The effect of applying G on |ψ〉 gives,
G |ψ〉 =
3∑
j=0
[−αj + 2 〈α〉] |j〉, (11)
where, 〈α〉 = 1
4
∑
3
j=0 αj is the mean of the amplitudes of the states in the
superposition, i.e. each amplitude αj will be transformed according to the
following relation:
αj → [−αj + 2 〈α〉] . (12)
To understand the purpose of using G, consider the following cases:
1- If the system is in the form
|ψ〉 = 1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉) , (13)
then 〈α〉 = 1
2
and applying G has no effect on the system.
2- If the system is in the form,
|ψ〉 = |x〉 , (14)
such that x ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} then 〈α〉 = 1
4
and applying G on the system
will create a superposition of all possible states with a phase shift of -1 on
|x〉.
3- If the system is in the form,
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉 + |y〉) , (15)
such that x, y ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} then 〈α〉 = 1
2
√
2
and applying G on the
system will transfer the amplitudes to the states that don’t exist in the
superposition, i.e. any hidden states in the superposition will appear and
already existing states will disappear.
5 Transmission Protocol
To send a bit, Alice prepares the system DpUf |00〉 ⊗ |0〉. Alice chooses the
appropriate Uf according to the following:
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1- The data to be sent is 0 or 1.
2- The data will be placed on the first or the second qubit.
3- To hide or not to hide the states.
Alice chooses an oracle from eight possible oracles. The oracle represents
both the message and the action applied by Alice on the message. Bob should
know in advance the correct qubit and that Alice will hide or not the states,
but has no knowledge of the content of the message. Assume that Alice and
Bob pre-agreed on a secret key of the form (A, p), for example,
H1H2N1H2N2..., (16)
where A is an action such that A ∈ {H,N}, H is to hide the superposition, N
is not to hide the superposition, and p is the bit position such that p ∈ {1, 2}.
According to the key, if the action is H then Bob applies G then reads the data
from the appropriate qubit. If the action is N then Bob directly reads data
from the qubit. In case of no eavesdropping, Bob will get the message correctly.
6 Detection of Eavesdropping
Assume that Eve is trying to intercept the message. Eve neither knows the
action applied by Alice nor the appropriate position of the message. Eve decides
randomly to apply G then measure (action denoted by GM) or to directly apply
measurement (action denoted by M). Then Eve has to decide randomly if the
data is placed on the first or the second qubit. Eve has a chance of 25% to
get the correct message. If the message is already encrypted, then Eve has
another problem to decrypt the detected message correctly. Eve has to resend
a superposition to Bob. Eve has two choices:
1- To resend the measured data as it is, action denoted by SM .
2- To prepare a random superposition, action denoted by PS.
To calculate the chance that Bob gets the correct message in the presence
of eavesdropping, consider the following cases:
Case 1: 1- In case Eve applied M and Bob was supposed to apply M then Bob
will get the correct message with a chance of 100%.
2- In case Eve applied M and Bob was supposed to apply GM . Ap-
plying G by Bob will create all the possible 2-qubit states equally
weighted, so Bob will get a random state with probability 25% and
the probability to get the data in the correct position is 50%. Bob
has a change of 12.5% to get the correct message.
Case 2: In case Eve decides to prepare a superposition then she should decide: (1)
if the correct data is 0 or 1. (2) to place the data on the first or second
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qubit. (3) to hide or not the states. (4) to choose one oracle out of four
possible oracles accordingly. Eve has a chance of 12.5% to prepare the
correct superposition.
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Figure 1: Tree of actions in the presence of eavesdropping.
Fig. (1) shows the tree of actions by Alice, Eve and Bob. The column to
the right shows the chance that Bob get the correct message according to that
path. There are five scenarios out of twelve possible scenarios where Bob has
no chance to get the correct message, one scenario to get the message correctly
with certainty and six different scenarios to get the correct message with certain
probability. Probability to detect eavesdropping when hiding states will be
95.3125%, higher than 85.9375% when Alice decide not to hide the states. The
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probability that Bob can’t detect the presence of eavesdropping will be 18.75%.
Alice and Bob can easily detect the eavesdropping by communicating a sufficient
number of bits.
7 Variations to the Transmission Protocol
Increasing the number of possible action taken by Alice and so by Bob will
increase the confusion for an eavesdropper in preparing a superposition to be
resent to Bob. This will increase the chance to detect the presence of eaves-
dropping. For example, Alice might increase her choices by deciding to:
- send the data directly without applying any operations. This allows Alice
to send variable size message by sending one or two bits at a time.
- encode the message as the Bell basis. 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) , 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉).
The 2-qubit register will represent the message instead of the oracle.
- send Bell basis as dummy data to confuse Eve.
- hide or not to hide the basis 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) , 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) to encode 0
(00 or 11) or 1(01 or 10).
8 Conclusion
Increasing the security of a communication channel is possible by hiding an
encrypted message in hidden quantum states. Process of hiding and showing
hidden states is fast since it has constant complexity. Any eavesdropper will
face two problems: to detect the encrypted message correctly and to decrypt
the message. By hiding the message and the eavesdropper applies direct mea-
surement, the message will be 100% secure. If the eavesdropper process the
superposition, the message will be 75% secure, and the communicating parties
have a chance of 81.25% to detect the presence of eavesdropping. Increasing the
securing of the communication is possible by applying simple variations to the
proposed method.
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